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GRUPO PROTEXA, S.A. v. ALL AMERICAN
MARINE SLIP
Stephen M. De Lucat
INTRODUCTION
In decisions of apparent first impression, the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey and the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit recently construed provisions of a
maritime insurance policy, an order of a port captain under
Mexican jurisdiction, Mexican maritime and constitutional law
and international law and the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea. The background of the case before these
courts can be summarized as follows:
On December 14, 1985, a diving support vessel named the
Huichol II ("Huichol") sank in the watery depths of the Bay of
Campeche, about 50 miles off the coast of Mexico and 1.5 miles
within the easterly border of the Petroleos Mexicanos ("Pemex")
oil exploratory zone.' More than 27 seamen died on board,2
thus prompting a public outcry and the Procuraduria General
de la -Republica ("PGR")3 in turn to order an investigation. 4
On December 17, 1985, the Port Captain for Ciudad de
Carman, State of Campeche, issued an order that was to be-
t Litigation Associate, Ross & Hardies, New York, New York. J.D., Pace Uni-
versity School of Law, 1992. Law Clerk to Hon. Thomas J. Aquilino, Jr., U.S.
Court of International Trade, 1992-94. He is a member of the ABA Section on
International Law & Practice, the American Society of International Law, and the
Maritime Law Association of the United States.
1 Grupo Protexa, S.A. v. All American Marine Slip, 753 F. Supp. 1217, 1218
(D.N.J. 1990).
2 Id. at 1218.
3 The PGR is similar to the U.S. Department of Justice. Id. at 1224 n.7.
4 Id. at 1218.
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come the focus of this maritime insurance case.5 The Port
Captain, Miguel Angell Rebolledo, 6 intended it as an order that
the owner remove the wreck.7 Indeed, he thought that raising
the wreck was imperative to allow the PGR to conduct its
investigation.8
More important for this litigation, the plaintiff, Grupo
Protexa, S.A. ("Protexa"), 9 interpreted it as a removal order10
which, if it wanted to continue doing business in Carmen and
for Pemex, it could not choose to ignore. It chose also to conduct
the removal itself, but due to incompetence and some bad luck,
the costs skyrocketed.
As a result of this litigation, Protexa learned that it should
have ignored the Port Captain's removal order and, even if it
chose not to ignore the order, it should have hired a professional
salvage company to raise the Huichol. Protexa further learned
not to rely upon the opinion of a staff attorney with no maritime
law experience that the removal order was legally valid and re-
quired removal of the wreck.
The defendants, All American Marine Slip ("AAMS") and
Cigna/AFIA, 11 refused to pay as excess layer underwriters of a
maritime insurance policy written by Energy Insurance Inter-
national of Houston, Texas ("EII").12 The policy permitted
wreck removal if it were compulsory by law and also required
that the owner, when removing the vessel, act as a reasonable
uninsured.13 These insurers contended that removal of the
wreck was not compulsory by law and that Protexa did not act
as a reasonable uninsured. 14
5 Id. at 1223.
6 Grupo Protexa, S.A. v. All American Marine Slip, 856 F. Supp. 868, 874
(D.N.J. 1993).
7 Id. at 875.
8 Id. at 874.
9 Protexa is a Mexican conglomerate engaged in many commercial ventures
through separate corporations, one of which, Condux, was the owner of the Huichol
when it sank. Grupo Protexa, S.A. v. All American Marine Slip, 753 F. Supp. 1217,
1218 (D.N.J. 1990).
10 Id. at 1221.
11 Id. at 1218.
12 Id. at 1219.
13 Id. at 1219-20.




Protexa chose to challenge this denial not in a Mexican fo-
rum but in the United States. It commenced suit in the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey. That court as-
sumed, without deciding, that the removal order was valid.15 It
then went on to examine other court's definitions of the term
"compulsory by law" and chose to decide whether removal of the
Huichol was compulsory by law by asking whether a reasonable
owner faced with the removal order "would determine that fail-
ure to remove the HUICHOL would likely expose it to liability
imposed by law sufficiently great in amount and probability of
occurrence to justify the expense of removal."16
The court concluded that removal was not compulsory by
law.17 It also found that Protexa had not acted as a prudent
uninsured,18 and that either determination was a basis for
granting judgment in favor of the defendants.' 9
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that removal of the Huichol could be found to have been
"compulsory by law" if it was either directed by governmental
order or statute or was reasonable under a cost-benefit analy-
sis. 2 ° Since the district court had only determined that removal
was not reasonable under the latter analysis, the court of ap-
peals remanded the action to the district court to determine
whether the removal order was valid.2 '
The court of appeals also found that the district court's
finding that Protexa failed to act as a reasonable uninsured was
not clearly erroneous. However, it also said that Protexa's fail-
ure to act as a reasonable uninsured may not preclude it en-
tirely from any recovery from the insurers pursuant to the
policy language because the policy appeard only to require that
the insured not take any steps that would interfere with the
insurers' efforts to defend their interests; however, the court
also found that based on basic contract law an obligation to act
15 Id. at 1228.
16 Id. at 1230.
17 Id. at 1236.
18 Id. at 1240.
19 Id.
20 Grupo Protexa, S.A. v. All American Marine Slip, 954 F.2d 130, 137-38 (3d
Cir. 1992).
21 Id. at 138.
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reasonably should be read into the insurance policy.22 The
court of appeals therefore remanded the action to the district
court for further proceedings to determine whether the policy
provisions allowed a partial recovery for Protexa limited to rea-
sonable removal costs. 23
On remand, the district court only addressed the first issue,
finding that the Port Captain did not have authority to issue the
order under Mexican law and that if the order were interpreted
as a removal order it would be inconsistent with Mexico's con-
stitution requiring due process, the principle of legality, and
Mexico's obligations under international law. The district court
therefore did not need to address the issue whether Protexa
would be entitled to reasonable removal costs despite its failure
to act reasonably at all times.
On appeal once again, the Third Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's dismissal of the case, finding that removal was not
compulsory by law under an objective balancing test, that the
act of state doctrine did not bar United States courts from in-
quiring into the validity of the Port Captain's order, and that
the removal order was invalid. 24
Underlying these decisions were subsidiary issues that are
of interest to international lawyers, if not only to the insurance
and maritime industries. Among other things, these courts had
to address the impact of the Act of State doctrine on whether
United States courts could address the issue of whether the re-
moval order was valid. It also gave rise to calling expert wit-
nesses during the remand proceedings to assist the court in
construing Mexican maritime law, international law and the
United Nations Convention on the law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
UNCLOS had been adopted by Mexico by the time of these
proceedings, but not until after the Huichol sank. Nevertheless,
the question arises whether, had it been adopted and come into
force before the Huichol sank, UNCLOS would have made a dif-
ference for the court in its determination that the Port Cap-
tain's order, if validly issued and interpreted as a removal order
under the Mexican constitution and Mexican law, would have
22 Id. at 140.
23 Id.





been inconsistent with Mexico's obligations under international
law. Now that UNCLOS has been ratified by 60 countries and
will come into force in November 1994, that question is now at
hand for those maritime entities with interests in Mexican and
other waters of countries signatory to the Convention. 25
This article looks at these issues as they were addressed by
the district court and the court of appeals in Grupo Protexa and
at what they mean for those now having to decide the same fate
of their ships and crew as Protexa had for the Huichol and its
crew.
I. CONSTRUING MARITIME INSURANCE POLICY LAW
Protexa at first had a policy that allowed removal not only
when it was compulsory by law, but also when deemed neces-
sary by the insured.26 AAMS was unwilling to provide such cov-
erage and thus wrote a policy which allowed removal only when
compulsory by law.2 7 The policy did not define "compulsory by
law," so the courts had to look elsewhere for assistance.
A. The District of New Jersey's Approach
The district court looked to decisions by the Second, Fifth
and Third Circuits, which varied in their construction of that
phrase, and tried to fashion one of its own.
According to the district court, the Second Circuit, in Sea-
board Shipping Corp. v. Jocharanne Tugboat Corp.,28 denied re-
covery because it found that the owner and hull underwriter
had not abandoned the vessel and that the government had not
issued an order directing removal.29 Likewise, the district court
in Protexa found that the Huichol had not been abandoned and
the Port Captain's order did not require removal; instead, it
merely required, according to an English translation, the post-
ing of a bond to cover the cost of removal should it take place.30
25 Unfbrtunately, the world's third worst disaster at sea occurred at the time
this article was being written. Richard W. Stevenson, Investigators Cite Bow Door
in Estonian Ferry's Sinking, N.Y. TIMES, October 1, 1994, at 6.
26 Grupo Protexa, 753 F. Supp. at 1219.
27 Id. at 1219-20.
28 461 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1972).
29 Grupo Protexa S-A, 753 F. Supp. at 1229 (citing Seaboard Shipping Corpo-
ration, 461 F.2d at 504.)
30 753 F. Supp. at 1229.
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In looking to the Fifth Circuit, the district court found that
that court of appeals rejected the Second Circuit's approach. In-
stead, in Progress Marine, Inc. v. Foremost Ins. Co.,31 the Fifth
Circuit "concluded that 'where removal was reasonably required
by law or where failure to remove would have reasonabl[y] ex-
posed an insured to liability imposed by law sufficiently great to
justify the expense of removal, then, we believe, such removal
could be considered "compulsory by law" for purposes of
recovery.' "32
The Fifth Circuit affirmed its approach in Continental Oil
Co. v. Bonanza Corp.,83 concluding, after consulting a lexico-
graphic source,3 4 that "removal should not be considered com-
pulsory by law only after 'a court has rendered a judgment
requiring it or when an official has issued a fiat.'-35 Instead,
according to the District of New Jersey, the Fifth Circuit held
that removal can be found to be compelled by looking "to the
state of affairs as they would appear to a reasonable owner
under the circumstances." 36
Looking to its own court of appeals, the district court
examined East Coast Tender Service v. Winzinger.37 There, the
Third Circuit rejected the Second Circuit's approach and
adopted the Fifth Circuit's in Progress Marine and Continental
Oil. The court of appeals held that protection afforded by an
insurance policy should not be restricted to situations where
there is an order from an authorized government official ex-
pressly directing removal.3 8
Protexa argued that a mandate from a government official
would ispo facto constitute legal compulsion, whereas AAMS as-
serted that a balancing test must be applied, weighing the like-
lihood of exposure to sanctions for failure to remove the vessel,
the sanctions themselves, and removal costs. 3 9
3' 642 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1982).
32 Id. (quoting Progress Marine, Inc., 642 F.2d at 820).
33 706 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1983).
34 THE RANDOM Housa DIcTioNARY 1369 (8th ed. 1981).
35 753 F. Supp. at 1229 (quoting Continental Oil Company, 706 F.2d at 1369).
36 753 F. Supp. at 1229-30.
37 759 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1985).





The district court concluded that "compulsory by law" must
be decided
by looking to the state of affairs as they would appear to a reason-
able owner under the circumstances and examining whether fail-
ure to remove a wreck would likely expose such owner to liability
imposed by law sufficiently great in amount and probability of oc-
currence to justify the expense of removal.40
Thus, the existence of such an order is not dispositive, and
neither is the actual validity or invalidity of the order.41 There-
fore, assuming without deciding that the Port Captain's order
was valid, it found that the order did not require removal but
only the posting of a bond, and that even if the order were valid
and required removal, the sanctions that might have been im-
posed upon Grupo Protexa for failure to remove the wreck
would not outweigh the cost of removal and therefore removal
was not reasonable.
B. The Third Circuit's Approach
The court of appeals determined that the district court's ap-
proach was incorrect and that Protexa's was right.42 In the
Third Circuit's view, the Second Circuit in Seaboard Shipping
Corp. required a governmental order mandating removal for
such to be compulsory by law.43 Since one did not exist in that
case, the costs of removal were not recoverable under the policy
at issue. However, if the order issued by the Port Captain in
Ciudad de Carmen is valid and requires removal, the costs of
Huichol's removal would be recoverable under the Second Cir-
cuit's approach.44
On the other hand, the court of appeals found that the Fifth
Circuit adopted a different interpretation which does not neces-
sarily conflict with the Second Circuit's. It rejected the Second
Circuit's view that removal can be compulsory by law only
where there is a valid order mandating removal. Alternatively,
the Fifth Circuit said:
40 Id.
41 Id. at 1230.
42 Grupo Protexa, 954 F.2d at 136.




PACE INT'L L. REV.
[Riemoval occasioned by an unarticulated or unreasonable appre-
hension of criminal or civil liability could not be considered "com-
pelled by law." On the other hand, where removal was reasonably
required by law, or where failure to remove would have reason-
abl[y] exposed an insured to liability imposed by law sufficiently
great to justify the expense of removal, then, we believe, such re-
moval could be considered "compelled by law" for purposes of
recovery. 45
It further required that the insured have a subjective belief
that removal was reasonably necessary. 46 Thus, removal can be
compulsory by law either when there is a valid order requiring
it or when removal would be subjectively and objectively
reasonable. 47
In Continental Oil, the Fifth Circuit affirmed its approach
in Progress Marine but eliminated the need to show the insured
subjectively believed removal was reasonably necessary.48
Hence, the Fifth Circuit requires a two-part analysis: that is,
removal can be found to be compulsory by law if removal is
either (1) directed by governmental order, statute or regulation,
or (2) reasonable under a cost-benefit analysis.49
The Third Circuit then addressed its own opinion in East
Coast Tender. There it held that the term "compulsory by law"
should not be restricted to situations where a governmental or-
der expressly directs removal.50 Therefore, in Grupo Protexa,
the Third Circuit held that, having examined the approaches of
the three circuits, removal can be found to be compulsory if it
was either directed by governmental order, statute or regula-
tion, or if it was reasonably perceived as necessary under a cost-
benefit analysis.51
On remand, the district court found the order required re-
moval but that the order was invalid and that therefore removal
was not compulsory under an objectively reasonable standard.
On second appeal, Protexa argued that removal was rea-
sonably required "because it believed it had to comply with the




49 Grupo Protexa, 954 F.2d at 138.
50 Id. (citing East Coast Tender Serv., Inc., 759 F.2d at 286-87).




order."52 The court of appeals noted that the district court had
previously rejected Protexa's claim that removal was necessary
under an objective balancing test. The court of appeals thus
said, in the second appeal, that
if the objective balancing test is adopted, Protexa can prevail only
if it can successfully challenge those findings, or if the removal
was compulsory by law because the order was valid, or if the in-
surance companies are barred by the act of state doctrine from
challenging the validity of the order.53
The court of appeals concluded that removal could be compul-
sory "even in the face of a government order later determined to
be invalid, so long as in an objective analysis the reasonable
costs of disobeying the removal order and the probable tort lia-
bility outweighed the removal expenses."541t then upheld the
district court's earlier finding that the costs of removal far ex-
ceeded the costs of disobedience and potential tort liability, and
therefore held that even if the order were valid, removal was
not compulsory by law.55
II. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
The district court recognized, prior to the first appeal to the
Third Circuit, that
the act of state doctrine generally precludes United States courts
from reviewing acts of foreign governments and that is particu-
larly true in respect to a controversy regarding property allegedly
located outside of that state's territorial waters, and whose loca-
tion is in potential conflict with a provision of a treaty.56
It held that as in Progress Marine, the absence of governmental
authority to issue the order is not dispositive; hence, it assumed
without deciding that the Port Captain's order was valid.57
To the court of appeals, the insurers argued, among other
things, that the Port Captain's order was not valid under Mexi-
can law and UNCLOS, whereas Protexa argued that the Act of
52 20 F.3d at 1230.
53 Id. at 1231.
54 Id. at 1234.
55 Id.
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State doctrine precluded United States courts from judging the
validity of an order issued by a governmental official of a sover-
eign state.58 Since the district court had not had a chance to
address these issues, the court of appeals remanded the matter.
It said that until the district court rules on whether the order
directed Protexa to remove the Huichol,
we should not decide (a) whether the act of state doctrine prohib-
its an American court from deciding whether the Port Captain
possessed the authority to order removal of the wreck or (b)
whether the Port Captain possessed such authority.5 9
On remand, the district court found that the policies that
underlie the doctrine - "adherence to principles of interna-
tional comity, respect for sovereign nations on their own
territory and deference to the executive branch in the adminis-
tration of foreign policy"60 - were not implicated.6 1 It further
said that this was simply an insurance coverage dispute be-
tween private parties of
no interest of the respective governments of Mexico, the United
States or the international community. No Mexican national pol-
icy is at stake. Rather, what hangs in the balance is the decision
of the Port Captain on a purely local matter that will eventually
determine who will pay the bill for the wreck removal. The pro-
priety of the Port Captain's behavior is ancillary to the real issue
before the Court. 62
The court further found that since Protexa was seeking to in-
voke the doctrine as a sword rather than a shield, and because
Protexa chose to seek recovery in the United States courts
rather than in Mexico, the doctrine should not be applied.
63
After having examined the doctrine and its supporting ra-
tionale, the court of appeals, in the second appeal, found that,
even assuming that Mexico had a substantial interest in the
case,
58 954 F.2d at 139.
59 Id.
60 856 F. Supp. at 883 (citing Environmental Tectonics Corp. v. W.S. Kirkpat-
rick & Co., Inc., 493 U.S. 400, 419 (1990)).
61 Id.
62 Id.




Protexa has not demonstrated - nor do we find - that this con-
troversy implicates separation of powers concerns of the sort nec-
essary to support invocation of the doctrine. 64
The court affirmed the reasoning of the district court and fur-
ther observed that Protexa had failed to offer "evidence sug-
gesting that our rejection of the act of state doctrine would
[hinder the conduct of foreign relations by the United States],
nor even a basis for believing that diplomatic difficulties could
arise in the aftermath of the case."6 5 Therefore, it held that
Portexa could not invoke the act of state doctrine in this mari-
time insurance case.
III. MEXICAN MARITIME AND CONSTITTIONAL LAW
Although the courts in the United States found that even if
the order required removal and the order were valid, removal
was not compulsory by law under an objective balancing test, it
is helpful to comparative and international lawyers to evaluate
the United States courts' examination of Mexican maritime and
constitutional law and international law and UNCLOS, for va-
lidity of an order under those legal provisions is an important
factor in evaluating whether compliance with the order is com-
pulsory by law.
On remand, the district court noted that the issue of
whether removal of the Huichol was "compulsory by law" "'can-
not be determined solely on a literal reading of the English
translation.' "66 It further said that
the inquiry centers on the interplay between Mexico's exercise of
its sovereign power in relation to the due process rights of its citi-
zens. If the sovereign's exercise of power is unbridled or author-
ized by law, then the Port Captain's order is valid. If the Port
Captain's order is in fact unauthorized by law or is proscribed in
the Constitutional sense, then the order is invalid. 67
Hence, it proceeded to set forth the text of the order at length
and to examine the laws upon which the order relied as author-
64 20 F.3d at 1238.
65 Id.
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ity and testimony by expert witnesses on Mexican law, interna-
tional law and UNCLOS.
A. The Port Captain's Order
The body of the order reads, in its English translation, as
follows:
This Maritime Authority is pleased to resolve after analysis of the
procedures conducted by it in connection with the sinking of Na-
tional Motor Vessel ("Buque Motor de Posicionamiento dinamico
Nacional") named "HUICHOL" having the following characteris-
tics: 499.83 gross tons, 151.57 net tonnage, registered in this Port
under number 2623 and owned by your Company, (to) refer the
following procedures to Higher Authority (in order) to request Ex-
pert Opinions from technical personnel and reports as to the
causes that occasioned the sinking of said Vessel at the following
coordinates marked by radar: Latitude 19 degree[s] and Longi-
tude 91 degree[s] 58.5' W., and therefore, based on the Sole Article
published in the Official Newspaper ("Diario Oficial") of the Fed-
eral Government dated March 28 of this year and on Articles
numbers 86 of the Law of Navigation and Maritime Commerce
("Ley de Navegacion y Comercio Maritimo") and 262 and 263 of
the Law of General Means of Communication ("Ley de vias Gener-
ales de Comunicacion"), requests that such Company "CONDUX"
S.A. de C.V., deposit the sum of Pesos $ 10,000,000.00 (Ten Million
Pesos and 00/100, Mexican Currency) to guarantee the cleaning up
of the area and the salvaging of said Vessle, in addition to guaran-
teeing any damage or loss that may arise in the course of the sal-
vage operations, hereby stating by way of clarification that such
sum may be furnished by a Bond or Deposit of Guaranty ("Billete
de Deposito") furnished by an Insurance Company to the name of
the Treasury of the Federal Government and for availability to
the General Directorate of the Merchant Marine, a term of 25
days from the date of notification of this resolution hereby being
granted as provided in the above cited Article 86.68
The language emphasized above references the authorities
upon which the order was issued and highlights the part that
shows that the order merely requires the posting of a bond, as
the insurers argued.




Despite the apparent imprecise and more polite than
mandatory language used by the Port Captain, the district
court accorded it order status.69 The court further said:
Captain Rebolledo's intent to issue an order weighs heavily in the
balance. Additionally, it is unnecessary for a Port Captain to be a
wordsmith in the preparation of a wreck removal order. Here, he
recited that the sinking of a ship had occurred, experts had been
appointed to determine the course of the sinking, the occurrence
fell within the purview of certain statutory articles, the vessel
must be salvaged, and that a bond must be posted within twenty-
five days to guarantee any damage or loss that may arise from the
salvage operation [of the vessel]. 70
In light of Captain Rebolledo's testimony that he intended the
order to require removal and in light of the full text of the order,
the court found that while it is true "'no phrase in the body of
the [Port Captain's] Order directed wreck removal,' "71 the order
requires that it be done. Hence, the court looked to the next
issue, whether the order was valid.
B. The Validity of the Removal Order
The court therefore turned to the authorities cited in the
removal order to determine whether the Port Captain had au-
thority to order Protexa to remove the Huichol. It then ex-
plained that, given that the Mexican constitution was modeled
after that of the United States,
answer to the inquiry centers on the interplay between Mexico's
exercise of its sovereign power in relation to the due process
rights of its citizens. If the sovereign's exercise of power is unbri-
dled or authorized by law, then the Port Captain's order is valid.
If the Port Captain's order is in fact unauthorized by law or is
proscribed in the constitutional sense, then the order is invalid.72
First, the court examined the text of Article 86 73 and the
testimony of experts on its interpretation. The court found that
69 856 F. Supp. at 882.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 883. (quoting 753 F. Supp. at 1232-33).
72 Id. at 870.
73 Article 86 reads as follows:
If a ship runs aground or sinks in a port, in an area considered as such in
terms of the last paragraph of Article 33, or in a general waterway of corn-
1995]
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the article "is territorially based, limited to the property of Mex-
ico, bounded by a twelve-mile border and limited to a port or in
an area considered as such. Furthermore, its application is re-
stricted to an obstacle to navigation or one which affects it." 74
The Huichol sank outside the territorial sea of Mexico, was not
part of the port 75 and was not an obstacle to navigation. Thus,
this article could not be a valid basis for the removal order.
Likewise, with regard to Article 263,76 the court found that
the language "provided it affects the port" was dispositive. Un-
like Article 86, Article 263 does not require a hazard to naviga-
tion. However, "affects the port" in an economic sense in no way
can be applied to the place where the Huichol sank, 45 miles
from the coast. "Because no navigation was interrupted within
the port or its vicinity, the Court [found] that the Huichol wreck
did not affect the port and that Article 263 was improperly
invoked."77
As to Article 262,78 an occurrence outside a port need not
affect the port as long as it affects the crew, as it did with the
munication, in a manner that constitutes a navigational obstacle or that af-
fects navigation, it shall be removed within the period set forth by the Navy
Department, by the owner, the ship owner, or by anyone with a legal inter-
est in the ship; all of whom are severally liable for the fulfillment of this
obligation. If the ship is not removed within the established period, the De-
partment will make a cost evaluation which will serve as the basis to make,
the claim of the corresponding rescue cost pursuant to the administrative
execution proceedings established in the Federal Tax Code, and the Navy
Department shall proceed by itself, or with the intervention of a third party,
to carry out the necessary works to effect the removal.
856 F. Supp. at 871.
74 Id. at 885.
75 Article 33 provides the following with respect to the determination whether
a body of water is within a port:
The location of shorelines and of banks of rivers, lakes and estuaries
that have not been declared ports, or that are under construction, will be
considered ports for the application of the provisions of this Law with re-
spect to vigilance, police and maritime accidents. Id. at 872.
76 Article 263 provides:
In the event of shipwreck within port, or in the vicinity [proximity] thereof
provided it affects the port, the owner or any interested company shall pro-
ceed to remove the wreck within the period set forth by the Harbormaster's
office; provided, however, that the provisions of Article 47 hereof will apply
in the event that there is a refusal to carry out the necessary works.
Id. at 872. Article 47 was not examined by the court.
77 Id. at 886.
78 Article 262 states that:
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol7/iss1/4
GRUPO PROTEXA
Huichol's sinking. However, the court found that the language
regarding reporting requirements pertains to actions that the
ship's Captain, as opposed to the Port Captain, must take.7 9
The Port Captain, acting pursuant to Article 262, may appoint
experts to investigate and turn over the results to the PRG;
however, the question pivotal to resolving this maritime insur-
ance dispute is whether he may impose the costs of removal
upon a private citizen.80
The court noted that, unlike Articles 86 and 263, Article
262 is not port centered and could conceivably be applied to the
performance of "police functions within [the Port Captain's] ju-
risdiction as they pertain to health, sanitation and customs.""'
However, given the Mexican constitution8 2 and the principle of
legality,83 the court found that because of the absence of a man-
[iun the event that of shipwreck, fire, collision, running aground, or of any
other accident outside a port which affects the cargo, the crew or any other
persons aboard, the captain shall proceed to conduct an investigation re-
cording the events in the navigation diary, or binaccle substituting it, with
an obligation to inform the maritime authorities upon arrival to port. If the
accident occurs in the port, notice will of course be given to the maritime
authorities, which will proceed to conduct the corresponding investigation
informing the Communications Department as soon as possible. The latter
may, if it is deemed appropriate, appoint two experts who will give an opin-
ion on the cause of the accident and on any parties presumed responsible.
Once the investigation is terminated the results thereof shall be turned over
to the Federal District Attorney within the term of five days.
Id. at 872.
79 Id. at 886. The court further noted that it
will not consider whether the Port Captain's decision was prudent or
whether his investigation could have been performed more economically by
divers or remote operated vehicles (ROV's). Nor will the Court's decision
second-guess whether the wreck could have remained at its original location
or why PEMEX was a disinterested observer to a catastrophe that occurred
at or near their oil equipment. To inquire as to those matters are precisely
the types of inquiry that intrude on a sister nation's sovereignty and pro-
voke an unnecessary diplomatic incident. Goodwill and comity preclude this
inquiry similar to application of the act-of-state doctrine.
Id. (footnote omitted).
80 Id.
81 856 F. Supp. at 886.
82 "Article 16 of the Mexican Constitution provides that 'no one may be both-
ered in his person, family, domicile, papers or possessions, except by means of writ-
ten order issued by a competent authority providing the basis and the reasons of
the legal cause for the proceedings.'" Id. at 874.
83 The Mexican Supreme Court has said, with regard to Article 16, that
all acts of authority must be properly and sufficiently based and reasoned;
the former meaning, that the legal provision applicable to the case must be
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date that the private citizen pay for the cost of investigation,
including removal costs, the Port Captain lacks authority to or-
der a private citizen to remove the wreck at its own expense.8 4
Further, the district court held that
[b]oth the relevant facts and the law to be invoked are constitu-
tional precepts that must be present to warrant application of a
law. Here, there is no law to apply and the facts are marginally
stated. The Port Captain's order that directed Protexa to remove
the wreck at Protexa's expense under this provision was likewise
invalid.85
"Because the Port Captain's order was not valid as to Protexa,"
the court concluded, "the wreck removal engaged in by Protexa
was not compulsory by law."8 6
On second appeal, the court of appeals agreed with the dis-
trict court's reasoning, and further rejected Protexa's argument,
in reliance upon the history of the EEZ concept and its enact-
ment into Mexican law, that the plain wording of Article 86
demonstrated the legislature's contemplation of having a "mari-
time zone of federal jurisdiction distinct from territorial wa-
ters," and that it intended Article 86 "to have effect in those
waters wherever they may be."8 7
The court of appeals found that in 1963, when the articles
were written, the EEZ concept was still in a gestational stage
and
mentioned in a precise manner; and the latter meaning, that the special
circumstances, particular reasons or immediate causes which were taken
into consideration for the issuance of the act of authority, must also be men-
tioned in a precise manner...
Appendix to Seminario Judicial de la Federacion (Weekly Judicial Gazette of the
Federation) 1917-1985, Third Part, Second Chamber, Number 373, at pp. 636-37.
The Court also said that
the responsible authorities do not comply with the Constitutional obligation
of giving the legal foundation and duly reasoning the resolutions which is-
sue by expressing the factual reasons and the legal considerations on which
they have [been] based, whenever all of the foregoing appears in a different
document.
Id., Eighth Part, Thesis Common to the Plenum and Chambers, Number 153, at
pp. 248-49. Grupo Protexa, 856 F. Supp. 874.
84 856 F. Supp. 887.
85 Id. (footnote omitted).
86 Id. at 889.




there were no contemplated waters of federal jurisdiction other
than those described in Article 1 of the 1940 Means of Communi-
cation Law, which provided the definition of "general waterway of
communication" and to which explicit reference is made by Article
6 of the Navigation Law.88
Therefore, it rejected Protexa's argument that Article 86 ap-
plied beyond Mexico's territorial waters.
IV. UNCLOS
Although UNCLOS was not cited as authority for the order
and became effective after the Huichol sank, the court ad-
dressed the testimony given by experts on UNCLOS and Mex-
ico's obligations under international law as they pertain to the
removal of the Huichol.
One expert testified that local statutes are to be construed
consistent with the coastal state's international obligations.8 9
881d.
89 The rights and duties of a coastal state are spelled out in Article 56 of
UNCLOS:
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, con-
serving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of
the waters superjacent to the sea-bed and its subsoil ....
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Con-
vention with regard to:
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations
and structures;
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
Article 60 provides, in relevant part, that:
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have the ex-
clusive right to construct and to authorize and regulate the construction,
operation and use of:
(b) Installations and structures for the purposes provided for in arti-
cle 56 and for other economic purposes;
(c) Installations and structures which may interfere with the exer-
cise of the rights of the coastal State in the zone.
2. The coastal State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over such artificial
islands, installations and structures, including jurisdiction with regard to
customs, fiscal, health, safety and immigration laws and regulations.
3. Due notice must be given of the construction of such artificial is-
lands, installations or structures and permanent means for giving warning
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If the court construes the statutes as not requiring removal, the
Mexican legislature would have to enact legislation to meet its
international obligations. If the statutes are applied to the ex-
clusive economic zone (EEZ),9° they would not violate interna-
tional law "unless it interfered with another state's rights."91
Another expert testified that to apply territorial statutes to the
EEZ would violate international law and further that "simply
because international law does not explicitly prohibit Mexico to
perform certain acts, it does not mean certain actions taken are
necessarily legal."92
According to one expert's testimony, the "designation of the
anchorage prohibited zone, the lack of statutory authority to or-
der wreck removal in the EEZ, and the failure to consult Pan-
ama [the flag state of the Huichol] are occurrences that trespass
the spirit of UNCLOS."93 Although another expert said that the
order was consistent with Mexico's obligations under interna-
tional, law, the court found that "none of the recited obligations
was relevant in regard to the Huichol."94 The court explained:
The Huichol was a maintenance vessel that supported PEMEX
operations. The wreck rested 1.3 nautical miles outside the east-
ern boundary of the anchorage prohibited area. The nearest oil
pipeline was 2.5 nautical miles from the wreck of the Huichol. Fi-
nally, the development trend of oil platform structures was in a
westward direction, away from the Huichol wreck. Because of the
of their presence must be maintained. Any installations or structures which
are abandoned or disused shall be removed to ensure safety of navigation,
taking into account any generally accepted international standards estab-
lished in this regard by the competent international organization....
4. The coastal State may, where necessary, establish reasonable safety
zones around such artificial islands, installations and structures in which it
may take appropriate measure to ensure the safety both of navigation and of
the artificial islands, installations and structures. United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CoNF. 62/122 (1982),
in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
90 Article 55 of UNCLOS provides that:
[tihe exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territo-
rial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under
which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and
freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant Provisions of this
Convention. See supra note 89.
91 856 F. Supp 888.
92 Id.
93 856 F. Supp. 888.




depth of the water, [an expert] testified that the wreck was not a
hazard to navigation in international waters. According to [other
experts], the Gulf of Mexico is littered with sunken vessels that
have never been raised from their initial place of rest. Further-
more, the Huichol was resunk at a much shallower location. 95
Thus, the court concluded that even if the order cited to UN-
CLOS and UNCLOS had been brought into force before the
Huichol sank, it would not be applicable. 96
V. CONCLUSION
The lessons learned in Protexa can be applied in other mar-
itime disasters. First, before an accident happens, one must be
sure that the insurance policy provides coverage in the event
that removal is determined to be necessary by the owner of the
vessel. One can only guess whether Protexa's insurance broker
obtained a lower premium for Protexa to pay the insurers in
return for the insurers' refusal to continue such coverage pro-
vided until 1985. However, it may also be asked whether the
objectively reasonable test applied by the Third and Fifth Cir-
cuits effectively inserts such a provision into every policy and
nullifies reliance merely upon an order or statute requiring re-
moval. One may wonder whether this could only lead to
problems in international relations arising from noncompliance
with lawful orders issued by an arm of a sovereign country. If
so, did the courts give too little weigh to the concern for comity?
Second it may be best to exhaust remedies available in the
forum provided at the situs of the accident. Although Protexa's
staff attorney thought that doing so in an Amparo proceeding
would be futile because he considered the removal order validly
issued and because there was no legal basis for bringing an
Amaparo, 97 the Court found that
Protexa should have met with the Mexican marine authorities
and demonstrated that the wreck of the [Huichol], as it lay imme-
diately after its sinking, presented no hazard to navigation, the
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 753 F. Supp. at 1226. He further concluded that seeking a stay or suspen-
sion of the order pending the outcome of an Amparo proceeding was not likely to be
granted because Protexa would be unlikely to prevail on the merits and would not
be able to prove irreparable harm from the failure to suspend the order. Id.
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marine environment or to offshore activity in the Pemex oil field.
Such a request, when accompanied by a well-prepared presenta-
tion by professional marine consultants, would have at least re-
sulted in the government['s] recognizing the need to allow Protexa
sufficient time to secure bids from professional salvors and very
well may have resulted in a complete retraction of the Order. 98
Thus, when evaluating whether removal is "compulsory by
law," it is risky not to have an experienced maritime insurance
lawyer examine the decree, statute or governmental regulation
and the laws cited in support so that challenges to a port cap-
tain as to the validity of the order can be made competently.
Nevertheless, the Protexa case also demonstrates that even if
this is done by a so-called expert, experts disagree and there is
no assurance that a decision to go ahead with removal will be
supported upon review by a United States court.
Third, resort to UNCLOS, now that it has come into force,
may not be of any help to show that a sovereign's exercise of
police powers over its exclusive economic zone is consistent with
its international obligations, unless it can be shown that its ex-
ercise of such power is pursuant to one or more of the duties
identified in Article 56 of UNCLOS. Yet, the Protexa case leads
one to ponder whether sovereign states have authority to take
actions beyond those required of them by UNCLOS and other
agreements despite their interest in promoting behavior that
protects the maritime environment and removes hazards to
navigation, which are both in the interest of the coastal state
and all those with maritime interests that transit those waters.
Further evaluation by international maritime bodies of the is-
sues addressed in Protexa is needed and perhaps inevitable.
98 Id. at 1235.
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